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INTHE

J

UT AH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plain tiff!Appellant,
V.

ROBBIE MICHAEL MACDONALD,
Oefendant/Appellee.

Brief of Appellant
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court granted the State's petition for interlocutory review of
two pretrial rulings. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code
Annotated§ 78A-3-102(3)(h) (West 2009).

INTRODUCTION 1
Eleven-month-old Gabriel suffered severe brain damage. Defendant
Robbie MacDonald, the only adult home with the baby when he was
injured, has been charged with second degree felony child abuse and
obstruction of justice. It is anticipated that MacDonald's defense at trial will

Because MacDonald has not yet been tried, he retains the
presumption of innocence. The facts alleged here and in the Statement of
Facts are drawn from sworn testimony given at several pretrial evidentiary
hearings.
1

be that the baby was injured in an accidental fall, rather than by an
intentional act.
The State appeals two pretrial rulings.

In the first, the trial court

suppressed two of three police interviews in which MacDonald gave
conflicting accounts about what happened. In the second ruling, the court
excluded evidence that showed MacDonald's contempt for the baby and
MacDonald's past physical aggression toward him.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Issue I(a): MacDonald was interviewed by police twice within five
days. In both interviews, MacDonald came to the police station voluntarily,
was unrestrained while speaking with unarmed plain-clothes detectives in
an unlocked room, and was allowed to leave afterward.
Did the trial court err when it concluded that MacDonald was not in
custody during these interviews?

Issue J(b): At the outset of MacDonald's first interview, officers read
him his Miranda rights and MacDonald confirmed that he understood them.
At the beginning of the second interview, MacDonald acknowledged that
he received the Miranda warnings before the earlier interview.
Did the h·ial court err when it concluded that MacDonald did not
explicitly or impliedly waive his Miranda rights?

-2-

Standard of Review: Whether an interrogation is custodial is reviewed
for correctness.

State v. Butt, 2012 UT 34, if 7, 284 P.3d 605. Whether a

defendant has validly waived his Miranda rights is a mixed question; the
court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error and its legal conclusions
are reviewed for correctness. See State v. Perea, 2013 UT 68, if 32, 322 P.3d
624.

Preservation: R944-45, 979, 1201 :27-39, 1202:44-52.
Issue II: The State moved under rule 404(b) to admit evidence that
MacDonald hated the baby and both verbally and physically abused him in
the weeks before he was injured. The trial court denied the motion.
Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it ruled that the evidence
was inadmissible under rule 404(b)?

Standard of Review: A h·ial court's rule 404(b) ruling is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion. See State v. Lucero, 2014 UT 15, if 11, 328 P.3d 841.

Preservation: R953-61, 1066-68.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following is reproduced in Addendum A:
Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
MacDonald repeatedly taunts and physically abuses his
girlfriend's 11-month-old baby

MacDonald began dating Addie L. in June 2013.

They moved in

together in early December 2013, along with MacDonald's 3-year-old
daughter, K.M., and Addie's 11-month-old baby, G.B. R1196:53-54.
Addie soon noticed that MacDonald had "a severe amount of
jealousy" toward her baby. R1198:9. MacDonald told Addie that her baby
was too "possessive" of her. Id. MacDonald would h7 to keep G.B. "away
from" Addie whenever he tried to follow her around their basement
apartment. Id.; 1205:52.
MacDonald thought that the baby "had an attitude towards him" and
"didn't like him." R1198:9, 11. And MacDonald made it clear to Addie that
he didn't like her baby either. MacDonald sometimes complained that the
baby "just look[ed] at him with big stupid eyes." R1198:11. MacDonald
told Addie that he thought the baby was "dumb" and called hhn a
"whiner" "throughout" their time together. R1198:11; 1205:56. On several
occasions, MacDonald even made fun of the baby's penis size. R1205:19.
MacDonald often com1nented negatively on G.B.'s race.

R1198:11.

The baby's father was Guatemalan, but MacDonald called him Addie's
"little Mexican." R1205:45.

MacDonald called the baby a "spic" several
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times, and he once told Addie that G.B. "didn't fit in our family because he's
brown." R1205:40, 42. One day, when Addie and MacDonald passed a
h·ailer park, MacDonald told Addie that the baby "would fit in there
because it's full of spies, but the rest of us wouldn't." R1205:43. MacDonald
said that he thought the baby's eyes were not" straight/' and he complained
that with "Hispanic babies," "their eyes are never straight." R1198:11-12.
MacDonald often yelled at the baby. R1198:12. Once in mid-January
2013, MacDonald flipped him off "with both hands" while shooting him "a

very mean look." R1205:46. And if MacDonald saw his daughter pushing
the baby, he wouldn't stop her. R1205:12.
MacDonald repeatedly told Addie that he "did not like to be
touched" by her baby. And while MacDonald sometimes let his daughter
onto their bed, he wouldn't let G.B. onto their bed-even if it n1eant that
Addie had to breastfeed her baby while lying on the floor. R1205:10, 27-28,
59.

MacDonald sometimes treated G.B. roughly.

Twice, MacDonald

stopped G. B. from following his mother around their apartment by
grabbing him "by the arm" and dropping "him in a beanbag chair rather
forcefully."

Rl 198:10; 1205:22.

Both times, Addie thought this hurt her

baby. Id.
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In early January 2013, G.B. came down with the flu. R1109:16.
Around January 10 or 11, Addie asked MacDonald to give G.B. medicine
orally through a syringe. Id.; 1205:31, 36. The next day, Addie noticed
bruises on the baby's jaw.

R1109:16.

It "looked like somebody had

squished his face to get him to open his mouth." R1109:17. When Addie
asked MacDonald about it, he denied hurting the baby and said that he
must have gotten hurt falling over. R1205:35.
The baby suffers traumatic brain injury
while left alone in MacDonald's care

Addie and MacDonald lived in a two-bedroom, partially finished
basement aparhnent in American Fork. R1196:57. The bedroom that K.M.
and G.B. shared did not have carpet, but it did have a "double layer" of
"fairly ncv/' and "pretty soft" rugs. Rl 196:58. Because of the way the rugs
overlapped, a s1nall strip of exposed concrete ran "about a foot along the
wall." Id.
After MacDonald flipped the baby off, Addie began thinking about
moving out. R1205:47-48. On the morning of January 18, 2013, MacDonald
promised Addie that he would start being a "good dad" to both children.
R1205:48. Addie said that he could "prove it" by watching both children

that day while she was at work. Id. She told him: "This is your chance."
R1205:50.
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Later that afternoon, MacDonald called Addie at work to tell her that
the baby was not breathing and that their upstairs roommate had called an
a1nbulance. R1196:60. Addie met them at the local hospital, where her baby
was "barely hanging onto life." Id.

The baby was later transferred to

Primary Children's Hospital. Id.
Dr. Christine Campbell, a pediatrician at Primary Children's Hospital
specializing in suspected child abuse cases, was brought in to consult on
G.B.'s case the day after he arrived. R1196:5-6. By then, G.B. was in the
intensive care unit. R1196:8. He was "not breathing on his own" and was
on a" particular type of ventilator" used in the "most critically ill children."
Id. G.B. had lung damage, was not responsive, and needed medication to
support his heart rate and blood pressure. Id.
Dr. Campbell found "subdural bleeding" in G.B.'s brain-a particular
type of bleeding "associated with very high energy, stopping and starting"
of the brain inside the skull, and which is commonly associated with cases
of "abusive head h·auma" or "shaken baby syndrome." R1196:13. She also
found "retinal hemorrhages" and "retinal folds" -two types of "very severe
damage" to the back of the eyes that happen only with "massive head
trauma." R1196:13, 16. G.B. spent a month in the hospital and has been in
intensive therapy ever since.

Rl 196:62, 64.
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Though he has improved

somewhat, he will most likely be permanently blind and have some degree
of lasting brain damage. R1196:17.
MacDonald's first interview

G.B. was injured on the afternoon of January 18, 2013. Later that day,
Detective Ryan Metcalf drove MacDonald to the police station for an
interview.

R1151.

The door to the interview room was closed but not

locked, MacDonald was not restrained, and MacDonald had a water bottle
with him the entire time. R1151; see also State's Exh. 3. 2 Detective Metcalf
was not armed, nor was he wearing a uniform. See id.
When the interview began, Detective Metcalf thought to himself that
it "was not likely" that MacDonald would be charged with any crime
stemming from G.B.'s injuries. R1201:9. Detective Metcalf nevertheless told
MacDonald:
Before we begin chatting, I just want to let you know, we've,
this is kind preliminary, we do this with everybody, ok, we
just want everyone to know, and you've probably heard this
on TV, your rights, ok? I'm not sure if you particularly need
these rights because we're just kind of asking what's going on
with [G.B.]. But I just wanted to get that out of the way, ok.
State's Exh. 3 at 4:30-5:02.

DVD's containing recordings of MacDonald's police interviews were
admitted as exhibits at an evidentiary hearing below and are included
together in the record in a folder labeled R1207.
2
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Detective Metcalf then advised MacDonald of each of his Miranda
rights. Id. at 5:02-5:24. Detective Metcalf then asked: "Do you understand
those rights?" MacDonald answered, "yes." Id. at 5:24.
Detective Metcalf asked MacDonald to explain what happened the
day that G.B. was injured. MacDonald told him that sometime after Addie
left for work, G.B. fell asleep on the floor while watching TV. Id. at 11:4812:32. MacDonald said that he picked the baby up and put him in his crib,
but that when he returned to check on the baby about a half hour later, the
baby was unresponsive and not breathing.

Id. at 12:32-13:10, 15:00-37.

Detective Metcalf asked if the baby had slipped or fallen or "hit his head on
something" before being put to bed; MacDonald said that he had not. Id. at
21:28-32.
The interview lasted one hour and four minutes. Id. at 4:30-1:08:00.
At the end, Detective Metcalf offered to drive MacDonald home or to let
him leave with a friend who was also there being interviewed. Id. at 1:08:19.
MacDonald said he was fine "either way." Id.
MacDonald's second interview

Five days after the initial interview, on January 23, 2013, Detective
Gregg Ludlow called MacDonald on the phone and asked him to cmne to
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the police station for another interview.

R1201:13.

MacDonald's

grandfather drove him to the police station and waited for him there. Id.
This time, MacDonald was interviewed by detectives Ludlow and
Liddiard, both of whom were in plain clothes and unarmed. R1201:13; see

also State's Exh. 4. MacDonald was again unrestrained, the door to the room
was closed but not locked, and the interview was recorded. See State's Exh.
4; Rl 148.

MacDonald had his cell phone in his pocket throughout the

interview. State's Exh. 4 at 1:12:10.
At the outset, Detective Ludlow said: "I know you talked with, was it
Detective Metcalf the other day?"

Id. at 0:50.

MacDonald responded

affirmatively. Id. Detective Ludlow then reminded MacDonald: "When he
brought you in, he talked to you about your rights and all that stuff? You
remember all that stuff, right?" Id. MacDonald responded affirmatively by
repeatedly nodding his head. See id.
Detective Ludlow then asked MacDonald to tell the1n what happened
~i

on the day that G.B. was hurt. Id. at 1:25. MacDonald initially repeated the
story he had told before- that after the baby fell asleep on the floor,
MacDonald put him in his crib without incident, only to find him a half
hour later not breathing. Id. at 2:59-4:50.
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But Detective Ludlow told MacDonald that medical tests showed that
G.B. had "suffered trauma" of some sort and suggested that MacDonald's
story was not accurate. Id. at 6:20-7:10. Detective Ludlow told MacDonald
that he did not "have any intentions of running you down to jail tonight,"
and then asked MacDonald to "come clean" and explain "what happen.ed
with that little baby." Id. at 7:10-57.
After some initial hesitation, MacDonald told the detectives that
when he walked into the room to put the baby in the crib, he tripped on the
rug and dropped the baby on the floor. Id. at 16:30-35, 18:40. MacDonald
said that the impact woke the baby up, but that he fell asleep after
MacDonald held him for about five minutes. Id. at 20:10, 52:12. MacDonald
then repeated his claim that he first realized the baby was hurt when he
checked on him a half hour later.

Id.

MacDonald denied shaking,

squeezing, or intentionally hurting G.B. Id. at 24:04, 25:50, 33:07.
Detective Ludlow also asked MacDonald about his relationship with
the baby. MacDonald insisted that he "loved" G.B.; he denied ever being
jealous of him or calling him racial epithets.

Id. at 31:00-32:12, 42:41.

MacDonald admitted, however, that he had called G.B. a "whiner" and had
flipped him off once. Id. at 32:00, 42:26.
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Toward the end of the interview, Detective Liddiard twice repeated
that they had "no plan" to take MacDonald "to jail tonight." Id. at 1:09:31,
1:12:36. An hour and 12 minutes after the interview began, the detectives

left the room. See State's Exh. 4 at 0:50-1:1:12:41. Detective Ludlow returned
a little over an hour later and asked MacDonald if he would "mind writing
down what we talked about." Id. at 2:20:38. MacDonald agreed to do so
and then filled out a written state1nent on a pre-printed form. See January
23 Statement. 3

At the top of that form was a printed paragraph that detailed each of
the Miranda rights and an express waiver of them. Id. MacDonald signed
imn1ediately below that paragraph. Id. Below this, MacDonald handwrote
a short statement in which he again claimed that he had accidentally
dropped G.B. after tripping on the rug. Id.
After filling out this statement, MacDonald left the police station with
his grandfather, who had been waiting for him outside. R1201:16.

MacDonald's third interview
The next day, on January 24, 2013, Detective Liddiard called
MacDonald and asked him to co1ne in for another interview.

R1201:17.

This written statement is included in the folder marked R1207. Like
the recording of the first January 18 interview, it is labeled "State's Exhibit
3."
3
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MacDonald's grandfather again drove him to the police station. But this
time, MacDonald's grandfather decided to go home rather than wait at the
station. Id.
This interview, like the previous ones, took place in an unlocked
romn with the door closed. R1145; State's Exh. 5. Detectives Liddiard and
Ludlow were again in plain clothes with no visible weapons, and
MacDonald was unrestrained. State's Exh. 5.
At the outset, Detective Liddiard

told MacDonald

that

his

grandfather had decided not to wait at the station, and he asked if
MacDonald wanted the detectives to drive him home after the interview.

Id. at 0:38. MacDonald said that would be fine. Id. Detective Liddiard also
assured MacDonald that officers would not take him to jail that day. Id. at
0:56.

Detective Liddiard reminded MacDonald that Officer Metcalf had
told him about the Miranda rights during the first interview, and that "we
reminded you yesterday and you were willing to talk to us, and you' re still
willing to talk to us today?

Id. at 0:58-1:48.

MacDonald nodded, and

Detective Liddiard continued: "I want to make sure that he didn't make
any 1nistake about your Miranda rights, I just want to tell you again, and
you can just tell us if you' re still willing to talk to us, is that ok. A lot of
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people laugh at us because they're like, 'well I've heard this on TV so many
times."' Id. Still nodding, MacDonald replied: "I understand, you have to
do it." Id.
Detective Liddiard then informed MacDonald of his Miranda rights,
after which MacDonald confirmed that he understood those rights and that
he was "still willing to talk" to the detectives. Id. at 1:48-2:07.
As the interview began, Detective Liddiard repeated that "no matter
what" MacDonald told them, the detectives would not arrest him and that
they would be taking him home.

Id. at 10:14.

During the interview,

MacDonald repeated his claim that he accidentally dropped the baby on the
carpet and did not shake or intentionally harm him. Id. at 10:51-56:53. The
interview lasted about 57 minutes, after which officers took him home.
The trial court suppresses the first two interviews

The State charged MacDonald with one count of child abuse, a second
degree felony, and one count of obstruction of justice, a third degree felony.
Rl-4, 1069-70, 1071-73.

MacDonald moved to suppress only the last two interviews.
MacDonald argued that (1) officers did not adequately advise him of his

Miranda rights during the second interview and (2) that the last interview
should be suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous h·ee" -i.e., from the failure
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to Mirandize him in the second interview. R286-93. At argument on
MacDonald's motion, the trial court questioned whether the first (January
18) interview should also be suppressed given the lack of an

II

explicit"

Miranda waiver. R1201:27-28.
After further briefing and argument, the trial court issued a written
ruling suppressing the first two interviews. R1143-52 (Addendum B). The
court did not suppress the last interview.
Trial court ruling on the first (January 18) interview: Miranda

warnings are required only when there is a "custodial interrogation."
R1143-52; see also State v. Perea, 2013 UT 68, if 92, 322 P.3d 624. Here, the trial
court ruled that MacDonald was in custody in the first interview because he
II

"was not free to leave" and the detective's questions were accusatory."
R1149-50. Thus, the court concluded that Miranda warnings were required.
The trial court then concluded that although Detective Metcalf had
read MacDonald his Miranda rights, MacDonald had not expressly or
impliedly waived his rights. Id. The court alternatively ruled that even if
there had been an implied waiver, it was "undermined" when Detective
1./!>

w

11

Metcalf told MacDonald that he wasn' t sure that [MacDonald] needed his
rights to be read to him." Id.
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Trial court ruling on the second (January 23) interview: The trial

court ruled that MacDonald was in custody for the second interview
because it was held in a police station with two officers present and their
questions were" accusatory." R1148-49.
The trial court reasoned that although the officers "reminded"
MacDonald that he had been read his Miranda rights five days earlier and
although MacDonald nodded in response, the lapse of five days made the
reminder insufficient.

Id.

Because the court concluded that the second

Miranda warning was ineffective, it also suppressed the second interview.
Id.

Trial court ruling on the third (January 24) interview: The trial court

did not suppress the January 24 interview because the detectives fully
informed MacDonald of his Miranda rights at the beginning of the interview
and expressly waived those rights. Rl 144-45.
The trial court excludes evidence of MacDonald's
contempt and mistreatment of the baby under rule 404(b)

Before the trial court ruled on the Miranda motion, MacDonald 1noved
to redact any part of the interviews in which MacDonald or the detectives
discussed whether MacDonald: (1) called G.B. a "whiner"; (2) made racist
comments about G.B.; (3) was jealous of G.B.; (4) flipped off G.B.; or (5)
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yelled at G.B.

R298-300.

MacDonald argued that this evidence was

inadmissible under rules 402, 403, and 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence. Id.
The State opposed this motion.

R376-85.

The State then filed a

motion in limine to admit the challenged statements as well as additional
evidence about MacDonald's mistreahnent of G.B., including

that

MacDonald had hurt G.B. by picking him up by his arms and roughly
dropping him on the beanbag chairs, and by squeezing his cheeks to the
point of bruising while giving him medicine. R953-61. The State argued
that the evidence was relevant for the proper noncharacter purposes of
showing MacDonald's motive for hurting the baby, to rebut MacDonald's
claim that the baby's injuries were accidental, and to provide context for the
alleged abuse. R1066-68.
The court issued a written ruling allowing some of the 404(b)
evidence but excluding other parts of it. Rl 163-78 (Addendum C). The
court ruled that evidence of MacDonald's racist comments could be
admitted for the noncharacter purpose of showing MacDonald's contempt
for the baby.

R1167-68.

But the court excluded other evidence of

MacDonald's contempt for the baby:
e

"'Whiner": The court accepted the State's argument that

evidence that MacDonald had called G.B. a "whiner" was
offered for the proper noncharacter purpose of showing
MacDonald's "contempt" for G.B. But it ruled that the
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evidence's probative value was minimal and outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice-namely, that the jury would
unfairly judge MacDonald for being an "impatient or bad
father." R1168-69.
•

Flipping off G.B.: The court also accepted the State's argument
that evidence that MacDonald had flipped G.B. off was offered
for the proper noncharacter purpose of showing MacDonald's
contempt" for the baby. But the court ruled that its probative
value was minimal and outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice. Rl 166-67.
11

• Yelling: The court ruled that there was no proper noncharacter
purpose for presenting evidence that MacDonald had often
yelled at G.B. R1169. The court did not enter a separate rule
403 ruling about the yelling evidence.
•

Past mistreatment: The court likewise ruled that evidence of
MacDonald's past mistreatment was not offered for any
noncharacter purpose. It also ruled that any potential probative
value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice. R1164-65.

• Jealousy: Finally, the court ruled that evidence of MacDonald's
jealousy toward G.B. "is not a prior bad act subject to Rule
404(b). Instead, the court analyzed this evidence under rule 402
alone. The court then ruled that such evidence was irrelevant
to whether MacDonald would II commit a violent act" against
G.B. and was thus inadmissible. R1165-66.
This Court granted the State's timely petition for interlocutory review
of both the Miranda and the 404(b) rulings.

Rl 180.

The h·ial court

proceedings are stayed pending the outcome of this appeal. R1185.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Issue I: The h·ial court erred when it suppressed the first and second

interviews.
First, Miranda warnings were not required because MacDonald was
not in custody for any of the interviews. A suspect is in custody for Miranda
purposes when he is arrested or .his freedom of movement is significantly
restrained to a degree associated with formal arrest. In both interviews,
MacDonald voluntarily came to the police station, was not restrained, was
interviewed by unarmed plain-clothes detectives, and was not threatened or
coerced. At the beginning of both interviews, officers made arrangements
to take MacDonald home afterward, thereby signaling that he would not be
arrested. And in the second interview, officers expressly told him that they
were not going to arrest him. Because MacDonald was never in custody,

Miranda warnings were not required. The suppression rulings should be
overturned for this reason alone.
Second, even if Miranda warnings were required, MacDonald
received Miranda warnings and validly waived his rights in his first
interview. Under Berghuis v. Thompkins, a suspect impliedly waives his
rights when, with a full understanding of those rights, he acts inconsistently
with them- such as by talking to police when police have told the suspect
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that he does not have to. Here, MacDonald was informed of his rights at the
outset of the interview, acknowledged that he understood them, and then
spoke with the detective. This was enough to constitute an implied waiver.
Third, the trial court incorrectly concluded that MacDonald was not
properly informed of his rights before the second interview. Once Miranda
warnings are given, officers are not required to repeat them before every
subsequent interview. Instead, so long as the suspect remembers and still
understands his rights, a subsequent decision to speak is valid.

Here,

MacDonald acknowledged at the outset of the second interview that he
remembered receiving his rights five days earlier during the first interview,
and he never expressed any confusion or misunderstanding about his
rights. His decision to speak was therefore knowing, and the trial court
erred in suppressing this interview.
Point

II:

The

trial

court improperly

excluded

evidence

of

MacDonald's contempt for and past mistreatment of the baby under rule
404(b).

First, just as evidence of MacDonald's racist comments were relevant
to a non-character purpose, so too was the evidence the court excluded.
Further, evidence of MacDonald's contempt for and past mistreatment of
the baby was relevant to the noncharacter purposes of establishing
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MacDonald's motive for hurting the baby and to rebut MacDonald's claim
that the baby was accidentally hurt. This Court and other courts have long
held that evidence of an abuser's past contempt or mistreahnent of his
victim is admissible for these very purposes. The evidence is also relevant
to put the State's case in context, in that it illustrates the nature of
MacDonald's relationship with G.B.
Second, the probative value of this evidence is not substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Because MacDonald's intent
is directly at issue, any prejudice MacDonald will suffer by its admission is
fair, not unfair. Moreover, the excluded evidence is not so inflammatory
that it is likely to rouse the jury to such overmastering hostility that it would
convict MacDonald on an improper basis. This is particularly so given that
the court decided to admit evidence of MacDonald's racist comments about
the baby, evidence that would be as-if not more-inflammatory than the
evidence that the court excluded.
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ARGUMENT

I.
Because MacDonald was not in custody, Miranda warnings
were not required; alternatively, MacDonald validly waived
his Miranda rights.

The trial court suppressed MacDonald's first interview because it
concluded that MacDonald never validly waived his Miranda rights.

It

suppressed the second interview because it concluded that MacDonald was
not properly informed of his Miranda rights.
This Court should reverse because MacDonald was not in custody for
either interview.

The officers therefore were not required to give

MacDonald his Miranda warnings, let alone secure a valid waiver of them.
But even if MacDonald were in custody, he validly waived his rights before
the first interview.

And, contrary to the h·ial court's ruling, MacDonald

received adequate Miranda warnings before the second interview.
A. Miranda warnings were not required before either interview
because MacDonald was not in custody.

The trial court concluded that Miranda warnings were required before
the

first

and

second

interviews

because

both

were

"custodial

interrogations." R1148-50. The court was mistaken.
The United States Supreme Court has "repeatedly clarified that a
suspect' s Miranda rights are contingent on his being subject to a custodial
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interrogation." State v. Perea, 2013 UT 68, ,192, 322 P.3d 624. A suspect is in
custody for Miranda purposes when he has been formally arrested or had
his "freedom of movement" restrained to a "degree associated with formal
arrest." ].D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S.Ct. 2394, 2402 (2011); accord Perea, 2013
UT 68, ~93 (person is in custody when he "has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom in a significant way").
In deciding whether smneone is restrained to a degree associated
with formal arrest, the court looks to "whether, in light of the objective
circumstances of the interrogation, a reasonable person [would] have felt he
or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave."' State v.

Heywood, 2015 UT App 191, ~49, 792 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (quoting Howes v.
Fields, 132 S.Ct. 1181, 1189 (2012)). Whether "an individual's freedom of
movement was curtailed," however, is "the first step in the analysis, not the
last."

Id. (quotations and citation omitted). Courts "must also consider

'whether the relevant environment presents the same inherently coercive
pressures as the type of station house questioning at issue in Miranda." Id.
(quotations and citation omitted).
Utah courts often consider four factors in assessing whether a
restraint is akin to the type of station house questioning at issue in Miranda:
"(1) the site of interrogation; (2) whether the investigation focused on the
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accused; (3) whether the objective indicia of arrest were present; and (4) the
length and forn1 of interrogation."

State v. Mirquet, 914 P.2d 1144, 1147

(Utah 1996); accord Heywood, 2015 UT App 191, if 50. "Indicia of arrest"
include things like "readied handcuffs, locked doors, or drawn guns."

Mirquet, 914 P.2d at 1147; State v. Levin, 2007 UT App 65, if15, 156 P.3d 178.
But no one "factor is dispositive." State v. Maestas, 2012 UT App 53, 272
P.3d 769. Instead, courts must "look to the totality of the circumstances" to
determine whether the requisite degree of coercion-and thus custodywas present. Id.
Although the trial court here mentioned all four factors, it primarily
relied on factors one and two: (1) the site of the interviews- the police
station; and (2) the investigation focused on MacDonald because the
officers' questions were" accusatory." Rl 148-50.
But the United States Supreme Court has held that questioning a
suspect at the police station does not mean the suspect was in custody. See

genemlly Cnlifonzia v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121 (1983). After police suspected
Beheler of being involved in a murder, Beheler "voluntarily agreed to
accompany police to the station house" for an interview. Id. at 1122. Once
there, "the police did not advise Beheler of the rights provided him under

Miranda," but im1nediately launched into the interview. Id.
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The Supreme Court nevertheless held that the statements were
admissible because Beheler was not in custody.

The Court held that

"Miranda warnings are not required 'simply because the questioning takes
place in the station house, or because the questioned person is one whom
the police suspect."'

Id. at 1125 (citation omitted).

Instead, "police are

required to give Miranda warnings only 'where there has been such a
restriction on a person's freedom as to render him 'in custody."' Id. at 1124
(quotations and citations omitted).

Accusatory questioning at the police

station was therefore not enough. See id.
Thus, while an interview's site and the presence of accusatory
questioning matter, the question of custody ultimately hinges on whether
the suspect' s freedom was curtailed to a degree associated with formal
arrest. See Mirquet, 914 P.2d at 1148 (the "necessary coercive environment
cannot be established by accusatory questioning alone"); United States v.

Lebrun, 363 F.3d 715, 723 (8th Cir. 2004) ("where there is no clear indication
that the defendant's freedom to depart has been restricted, we have
typically concluded that a police station interview was noncustodial").
This is true even when an officer clearly states "that the person under
interrogation is a prime suspect."' State v. Worthington, 970 P.2d 714, 717
(Utah App. 1998) (quoting Stansbury v. Cnlifornin, 511 U.S. 318, 324 (1994).
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Such a statement "is not, in itself, dispositive of the custody issue, for some
suspects are free to come and go until the police decide to make an arrest."'

Id. (quoting Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 324).
Telling a suspect during the interview that he is "free to leave" and
"not under arrest" strongly suggests that the suspect was not in custody.

United States v. Galceran, 301 F.3d 927, 930 (8th Cir. 2002). Such assurances
matter because they inform the suspect that "there is no arrest or restriction
on his freedom of movement," which is the sin qua non of a custodial
interrogation.

Worthington, 970 P.2d at 716 (quotations and citation

omitted).
Under these well-established standards, the trial court below
erroneously concluded that MacDonald was in custody in the first and
second interviews.

While both interviews were conducted at the police

station and involved some accusatory questioning, MacDonald's freedom
was neither resh·ained nor subjected to arrest-like coercive pressure. In both
cases, MacDonald voluntarily came to the police station. Rl 148-49, 1151.
Both interviews were in an unlocked room. R1148, 1151. MacDonald was
never restrained or placed in handcuffs. See generally State's Exh.'s 3 & 4. In
both interviews, the detectives were unarmed and in plain clothes. And
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MacDonald was never deprived of food or water-to the contrary, he had a
water bottle with him throughout the first interview. See State's Exh. 3.
MacDonald also was not isolated, which is the coercive effect Miranda
sought to dispel. His grandfather waited for him outside during the first
interview, and MacDonald expressed no concern when told that his
grandfather decided not to wait for him during the second interview.
Moreover, MacDonald had his cell phone with him during the second
interview. State's Exh. 4 at 1:12:10. That fact, too, suggests that MacDonald
was not in custody. See, e.g., United States v. Holleman, 743 F.3d 1152, 1160
(8th Cir. 2014); Smith v. State, -- S.E.2d --, 2015 WL 5316786 (Ga. Sept. 14,
2015).
Moreover, toward the end of the first interview, Detective Metcalf
openly discussed ways to get MacDonald home that night, thereby
reminding him that he was free to leave. State's Exh. 3 at 1:08:19. And
during the second interview, the detectives repeatedly told MacDonald that
they had no "plans" or "intentions" of arresting him or taking him to jail.
State's Exh. 4 at 7:10-57, 1:09:31, 1:12:36.
In short, in both instances, MacDonald came voluntarily, was never
threatened, was never restrained, was never isolated from the outside
world, and received assurances that he would be allowed to leave. Because
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he was never "taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom in a
significant way," Miranda warnings were not required. Perea, 2013 UT 68,

il 92. The trial court's suppression rulings should be overturned for this
reason alone.
B. Under Berghius v. Thompkins, MacDonald validly waived his
Miranda rights before the first interview.

Even if MacDonald were in custody, he validly waived his Miranda
rights in both interviews.
As stated, the h·ial court suppressed the first interview based on its
conclusion that although MacDonald was advised of his rights, he did not
validly waive them either expressly or impliedly. R1150. The trial court
was correct as to the lack of an express waiver. Detective Metcalf asked
MacDonald if he understood his rights, but he did not ask MacDonald if he
waived them. State's Exh. 3 at 5:24.
But the trial court was wrong that there was no implied waiver. As
"a general proposition, the law can presume that an individual who, with a
full understanding of his or her rights, acts in a manner inconsistent with
their exercise has made a deliberate choice to relinquish the protection those
rights afford." Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370,385 (2010). Thus, when a

Miranda warning is given and is "understood by the accused, an accused's
uncoerced statement establishes an implied waiver of the right to remain
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silent." Id. at 384. In other words, if a suspect who, after hearing his rights,
says that he understands those rights and then goes ahead and talks to
police, he has implicitly waived those rights.
That's exactly what happened here.

Before the first interview,

Detective Metcalf infonned MacDonald of each of his Miranda rights. State's
Exh. 3 at 5:02-5:24. MacDonald made eye contact with Detective Metcalf
throughout this colloquy, and he answered "yes" when the detective asked
whether he understood those rights. Id. Under Berg/mis, this constituted an
implied waiver.
The trial court here nevertheless concluded that any implied waiver
was invalid because the detective undermined the Miranda warnings when
he suggested that MacDonald did not need his rights read to him:
Before we begin chatting, I just want to let you know, we've,
this is kind preliminary, we do this with everybody, ok, we
just want everyone to know, and you've probably heard this
on TV, your rights, ok? I'm not sure if you particularly need
these rights because we're just kind of asking what's going on
with [G.B.]. But I just wanted to get that out of the way, ok.
State's Exh. 3 at 4:30-5:02.

The court reasoned that these comments so

"undermined" the Miranda warnings that it rendered any waiver
unknowing. Rl150.
The h·ial court was mistaken.

As an initial 1natter, the court was

1nistaken that the officer's statement "undermined" the rights at all. The
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officer never told MacDonald that he did not have these rights or that they
weren't important. Rather, all he did was seek to assure MacDonald that he
was not in trouble at that point, a statement that was h·ue.
Despite this, the trial court seems to have concluded that this
statement made the waiver unknowing.

But again, a suspect impliedly

waives his rights when, with a full understanding of his rights, he chooses
to speak with officers anyway. Bergliuis, 560 U.S. at 384. In assessing this,
courts look to the "totality of the circumstances," including the suspect' s
mental state, his age, and his "level of education." State v. Bybee, 2000 UT
43,

if il 17-18, 1 P.3d 1087. This inquiry does not turn on whether the suspect

"was in an optimal mental state" when he decided to speak to officers;
rather, it turns on whether the suspect "was able to understand his
important, yet relatively simple Miranda rights." Id. at iJ27. In Bybee, for
example, a waiver was knowingly made, even though it was made by a
"severely depressed" 17-year-old 10th-grade dropout who was in an inpatient h·eatment facility when he was interviewed by police. Id. at ilif 4, 10,
22.

Despite these cognitive problems, the suspect, who had only an

"average intelligence," was still able to "comprehend[ ] his right to re1nain
silent," therefore making his decision to speak to officers anyway a knowing
one. Id. at ,I21.
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Contrary to the trial court's conclusion, telling a suspect that he's not
in trouble does not change this. In United States v. Male Juvenile, 121 F.3d 34,
40-42 (2d Cir. 1997), for example, the Second Circuit held that even though
the officer falsely assured the suspect that he "wasn't in trouble" before
beginning the interview, the suspect' s decision to speak to the officer was
still valid because the suspect understood what his rights were.
The same is true here. MacDonald was a 23-year-old college student
at the time of this interview. State's Exh. 3 at 7:56, 9:16. Nothing in this
record suggests that he was impaired or cognitively challenged at all, let
alone in such a pronounced manner that he was incapable of understanding
his "relatively simple Miranda rights" when they were read to him. Bybee,
2000 UT 43,

if 27. Moreover, Detective Metcalf never told MacDonald that

he did not have the right to ren1ain silent. Instead, at most, the detective
suggested that he thought MacDonald did not need to exercise that right
because Detective Metcalf didn't think MacDonald had done anything
wrong at that point. State's Exh. 3 at 4:30-5:02. When MacDonald chose to
speak with him, he therefore did so with a full understanding of his right
not to.
In short, the record shows that "a Miranda warning was given" and
"was understood" by MacDonald. Berg/mis, 560 U.S. at 384. MacDonald's
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decision to speak with the detective thus established "an implied waiver of
the right to ren1ain silent." Id. The trial court erred in holding otherwise.
C. MacDonald's decision to speak to the detectives in the second
interview was properly informed because he acknowledged
that he had been advised of his rights just five days earlier.

The trial court suppressed the second interview because it believed
that MacDonald had not been fully advised of his Miranda rights. The trial
court acknowledged that the detectives had "reminded" MacDonald that he
had been read his Miranda rights in the first interview and that MacDonald
"nodded affirmatively" in response, but reasoned that this was not enough
to show that MacDonald had been advised of his rights. R1148-49.
As noted, Berghuis established that a suspect impliedly waives his

Miranda rights when, after receiving those rights, he speaks to police. Such
a waiver is not undone by the passage of time so long as nothing in the
interim "caused him to forget the rights of which he had been advised and
which he had understood" earlier. Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42, 49 (1982).
Whether an earlier Miranda warning and waiver remained valid after an
interruption depends on the totality of the circumstances.

Id. at 47-49.

In State v. Teuscher, this Court recognized that while "Miranda
warnings do not have 'unlimited efficacy or perpetuity,' a warning once
given may have continuing effect beyond the interview in question." State
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v. Teuscher, 883 P.2d 922, 930 n.5 (Utah App. 1994), overruled on other grounds
by State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50, 144 P.3d 1096. Thus, although three days
passed between the warned interview and the unwarned interview, this
Court held that the warnings and waiver remained valid. Id.
Other courts have followed this approach.

The Tenth Circuit, for

example, has stressed that "[n]umerous courts have rejected the argument
that the passage of time alone invalidates previously given Miranda
warnings." Mitchell v. Gibson, 262 F.3d 1036, 1057 (10th Cir. 2001 ). Instead,
once the defendant is warned, the question is whether, because of the
passage of time or some other factor, the defendant had forgotten

II

the

rights of which he had been advised" before waiving them during the
subsequent interview. Id. at 1058; accord United States v. Clay, 408 F.3d 214,
222 (5th Cir. 2005) (" the passage of time is not itself necessarily sufficient to
render Miranda warnings ineffective/' and the question remains whether the
suspect "either no longer understood those warnings or did not appreciate
their applicability" during subsequent questioning).
While

II

no mechanical rule" measures

II

the longest permissible

interval between the last warning and the accused's statement," the "mere
lapse of time" does not automatically render a previous Miranda warning
invalid. 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1264. Warnings must be repeated only
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when the earlier warnings "are so stale and remote that a substantial
possibility exists that the suspect was unaware of his or her constitutional
rights at the time subsequent interrogation occurs."' State v. Frazier, 622
N.W.2d 246, 254 (S.D. 2001) (quoting People v. Baltimore, 685 N.E.2d 627, 630
(Ill. App. 1997)).
Applying this rule, courts have concluded that prior Miranda
warnings remained valid in situations involving comparable or even longer
time gaps than the one at issue here. See, e.g., Biddy v. Diamond, 516 F.2d
118, 122 (5th Cir. 1975) (12-day gap); Koger v. State, 17 P.3d 428, 431-32 (Nev.
2001) (12-day gap); Davis v. State, 698 So.2d 1182,_ 1189-90 (Fla. 1997) (8-day
gap); Martin v. Wainwright, 770 F.2d 918, (11th Cir. 1985) (5-day gap),

abrogated on other grounds by Coleman v. Singletary 30 F.3d 1420 (11th Cir.
1994); Maguire v. United States, 396 F.2d 327, 331 (9th Cir. 1968) (3-day gap);

United States v. Clay, 408 F.3d 214, 221-22 (5th Cir. 2005) (2-day gap); People
v. Mickle, 814 P.2d 290, 306 (Cal. 1991) (36-hour gap); Osborne v. State, 430
S.E.2d 576,578 (Ga. 1993) (1-day gap).
This is particularly so when, at the outset of the subsequent interview,
officers remind the suspect of the warnings he received during the initial
interview and then confirm that the suspect remembers them.

See, e.g.,

United States v. Nguyen, 608 F.3d 368, 375 (8th Cir. 2010); Koger, 17 P.3d at
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431-32; Ex Parle Landrum, 57 So.3d 77, 88-89 (Ala. 2010). In such cases, the
suspect's acknowledgment of the earlier warning is a strong indicator that
the suspect both remembers and still understands his rights.
MacDonald was advised of his Miranda rights before his first
interview, after which he told Detective Metcalf that he understood them.
State's Exh. 3 at 5:24. Then, before the second interview, Detective Ludlow
reminded MacDonald of the warnings he received only five days earlier: "I
know you talked with, was it Detective Metcalf the other day?" State's Exh.
4 at 0:50. MacDonald responded affirmatively. Id. Detective Ludlow then
confirmed that MacDonald remembered the earlier warnings: "When he
brought you in, he talked to you about your rights and all that stuff? You
remember all that stuff, right?"

Id.

MacDonald again responded

affirmatively by nodding his head. See id.
And MacDonald's statements during the third interview corroborate
that he remembered and understood his rights.

As the trial court

recognized, the detectives informed MacDonald of his rights at the outset of
that interview and obtained an express waiver. Notably, when Detective
Liddiard told MacDonald that he "didn't make any mistake about your

Miranda rights," and reminded him that he could "just tell us if you're still
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willing to talk to us, is that ok," MacDonald responded: "I understand, you
have to do it." State's Exh. 5 at 0:58-1:48.
In short, the second interview was bookended by two interviews in
which MacDonald was expressly advised of his rights and chose to speak to
officers anyway.

MacDonald never expressed any confusion about his

rights, nor has he ever proffered any fact suggesting that he had forgotten
them. The trial court therefore erred in suppressing the second interview.
D. The written statement MacDonald filled out at the end of the
second interview was also admissible.

At the close of the second interview, MacDonald filled out a written
statement on a preprinted form. At the top of that form, MacDonald signed
an acknowledgement of his Miranda rights. See January 23 Statement.
The trial court briefly discussed this written statement in its ruling.
R1146. There, the court appears to have concluded that the Miranda waiver
on that written statement did not retroactively cure the detectives' earlier
failure to give the warnings before the interview began under Missouri v.

Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004). Id. As discussed, however, the interview itself
was admissible because the Miranda warnings that MacDonald had earlier
received remained valid.
Though somewhat unclear, it appears that the trial court also may
have meant to separately suppress the written statement itself. Rl 146-47. If
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it did, that ruling should be overturned for the same reason: namely,
because the Miranda warning given during the first interview remained
valid, MacDonald's written statement was properly informed-particularly
given that MacDonald then signed a Miranda waiver before filling this
statement out.

If the trial court meant to suggest that Seibert would also invalidate
that written waiver-thereby rendering the written statement itself
inadmissible- the court was wrong.

Seibert was a fractured case that

produced no controlling majority opinion. But the Supreme Court has since
adopted the position taken by Justice Kennedy in his Seibert concurrence:
namely, that what Seibert prohibits is the use of a "calculated" "two-step
interrogation technique" in which officers question a suspect without giving
him the warnings, only to then immediately give the warnings and procure
an identical confession in one "blended" "continuum" that effectively
"undermines" the efficacy of the warnings. Bobby v. Dixon, 132 S.Ct. 26, 31
(2011).
This is far from what happened here. As discussed, at the beginning
of this interview, detectives affirmatively reminded MacDonald of the
warnings that he had earlier received. After speaking with MacDonald for
an hour and 12 minutes, officers then left him alone in the interview room
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for over hour, only to then come back and provide him with a written form
that contained a recitation of the Miranda warning. See State Exh. 4 at 1:122:20. Thus, unlike the situation at issue in Seibert, MacDonald was
effectively given the warnings twice- once through a reminder, and once
directly-and because there was an hour gap between the end of the
interview and receipt of the written statement, there was no "blended
continuum" that undermined the later warning. To the extent that the trial
court meant to separately suppress the written statement, this Court should
therefore hold that it was admissible independent of the verbal statements
made during the January 23 interview.
II.

Evidence that MacDonald hated the baby and treated him
roughly was admissible under rules 404(b) and 403.

In its rule 404(6) ruling, the trial court admitted evidence of
MacDonald's racist comments, concluding that his "feelings" toward G.B.
"in the weeks before" he was injured "are relevant to proving who injured"
him. Rl 168. The court thus concluded that the "probative value of these
statements is high" and that it was "unlikely that these statements [would]
rouse the jury to overmastering hostility."

R1167-68.

Indeed, the court

thought that the racist comments were "tame in comparison to the alleged
abuse." Rl 167-68.

-38-

The court, however, excluded evidence that MacDonald called the
baby a whiner, flipped the baby off, yelled at the baby, was jealous of him,
and had hurt him before. R1165-69. As detailed above, the court concluded
that this evidence was either not relevant to a non-character purpose or
unfairly prejudicial. See id.
The trial court abused its discretion. If the evidence of MacDonald's
racism was admissible, so too was the other evidence detailed above.
A. Evidence of the defendant's past conduct towards the same
victim is routinely admitted for proper non-character purposes.

"Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a
person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person
acted in conformity with the character."
evidence

II

may be admissible," however

Utah R. Evid. 404(b)(l).
II

Such

for another purpose, such as

proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
absence of mistake, or lack of accident." Utah R. Evid. 404(b)(2).
Rule 404(b) is an "' inclusionary rule,"' presumptively admitting
evidence so long as it is relevant to a proper, noncharacter purpose. See State
V.

Bair, 2012 UT App 106, ,r17, 275 P.3d 1050 (quoting State

UT 57,

V.

Decorso, 1999

if 24, 993 P.2d 837). To be relevant, the evidence must also go to a

contested issue at trial. See State v. Verde, 2012 UT 60, ,I,I24-26, 296 P.3d 673.
Even if the evidence tends to show a bad character trait, this alone does not
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render it inadmissible; rather, it "is only excluded where the sole reason it is
being offered is to prove bad character or to show that a person acted in
conformity with that character." State v. Olsen, 869 P.2d 1004, 1010 (Utah
App. 1994) (citations and additional quotation marks omitted); accord Verde,
2012 UT 60, ~24; 2 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's
Federal Evidence§ 404.20 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., Matthew Bender 2d
ed. 1997) (updated 2010) ("Rule 404(b) adopts an inclusionary approach,
generally providing for the admission of all evidence of other acts that is
relevant to an issue in trial, excepting only evidence offered to prove
criminal propensity"); Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirckpatrick,
Federal Evidence§ 4.21 at 692 (3d ed. 2007) (same). 4
To be ad1nissible, acts must be (1) relevant (2) to a proper,
noncharacter purpose and (3) their probative value must not be
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Bair, 2012 UT
App 106, i!17; accord State v. Lucero, 2014 UT 15, ~13, 328 P.3d 841 ("evidence
of prior bad acts must be relevant and offered for a genuine, noncharacter

Because the language of the federal rule is identical, Utah courts
consider sources interpreting the federal rule as persuasive authority of the
meaning of Utah's rule. See State v. Leleae, 1999 UT App 368, ~43 n.5, 993
P.2d 232.
4
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purpose; furthermore, the probative value of the evidence must not be
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice").
Courts have long recognized the admissibility of evidence of a
defendant's past words or conduct toward the same person who is alleged
to be the victim in the present case. In cases where the defendant is alleged
to have intentionally hurt the victim, for example, the State is permitted to
introduce evidence that presents "the jury with a reason" why the
defendant would do so, "thus making 'more plausible"' the '"State's theory
that he did so intentionally,"' rather than accidentally. State v. Eisner, 2001
UT 99, ,158, 37 P.3d 1073.
Utah courts have commonly admitted such evidence in child abuse
cases. Our" child abuse case law clearly indicates that evidence of instances
of uncharged abuse involving the same victim and the same defendant is
admissible for proper noncharacter purposes." State v. Killpack, 2008 UT 49,
,146, 191 P.3d 17. "Such evidence is often indicative of the defendant's state

of mind and completes the story of the charged abuse." Id. (quotations and
citations omitted). "Furthermore, evidence of prior child abuse is allowed
to show identity, intent or mental state, and lack of accident or mistake." Id.
(quotations and citations omitted); accord State v. Reed, 2000 UT 68, 'if 26, 8
P.3d 1025 (admitting "evidence of multiple instances of sexual contact with
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the victim in this case" because it demonstrated "an ongoing behavior
pattern which included [the defendant's] abuse of the victim," "the manner
in which [he] intensely pursued the victim," and "the extensive preparation
and planning in which [he] engaged to create opportunities for sexual
contact with the victim"); Teuscher, 883 P.2d at 927 ("Evidence regarding
prior instances of abuse perpetrated against the victim is clearly admissible
in Utah to show identity, intent or mental state, and lack of accident or
mistake.").
"The theory underlying the introduction of evidence regarding a
prior violent relationship" between a defendant and the alleged victim "is
not that the assailant is a bad person and that bad people are likely to
commit the charged offense."

State v. LaRock, 470 S.E.2d 613, 630 n.27

(W.Va. 1996). "Instead the theory under which such evidence is allowed
arises from the idea that, when a defendant has demonstrated the same type
of violence towards a victim on a recent occasion, it is probative of his or her
intent, motive, malice, and premeditation."

Id.

Thus, the evidence is

properly admitted to" demonstrate some prior animosity to explain why the
accused had a 1notive to do the illegal acts charged in the indictment." Id.
In this sense, the evidence of the "prior relationship between the defendant"
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and his alleged victim is not only "relevant, it is also considered crucial
evidence in proving premeditation" or intentional conduct. Id.
And in shaken baby cases like this one, courts have long allowed
prosecutors to introduce evidence of the defendant's past animosity or
abuse toward the victim for proper non-character purposes. In State v. Mott,
for example, the Arizona Supreme Court held that evidence that the
defendant had previously struck a child and said that she "hated" her was
admissible to show the defendant's motive in a prosecution for violently
shaking her. 931 P.2d 1046, 1055 (Ariz. 1997). The court explained that this
evidence "de1nonstra ted defendant's lack of concern or actual dislike for her
child, which could reasonably be construed as a motive for the charged
offenses." Id.
In Smith v. State, the Arkansas Court of Appeals similarly held that
evidence that the defendant, a day care caregiver, had told the baby to "shut
up" and had been rough with him was ad1nissible in her prosecution for
shaking him. 205 S.W.3d 173, 178 (Ark. App. 2005). The court explained
that this evidence showed the defendant's "mental state" and "the absence
of mistake or accident."
11

Id.

The court further held that this evidence

tended to show" that the defend ant "manifested indifference" to the

child's "well-being," and that the "h·ier-of-fact was entitled to know" about
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the past incidents because they "tended to contradict" the defendant's claim
that the victim's "injuries were the result of an accident." Id.
B. Evidence of MacDonald's yelling and past mistreatment was
relevant for the proper non-character purposes of establishing
motive, lack of accident, and context.

As noted, under the first step of the 404(b) analysis, evidence is
admissible if it "tends to prove some fact that is material to the crime
charged- other than defendant's propensity to commit crhne." Lucero, 2014
UT 15, ~17.

Proper purposes include, but are not limited to, "motive,

opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of
mistake, or lack of accident." Utah R. Evid. 404(b)(2).
Here, the trial court admitted evidence of MacDonald's racist
comments toward G.B., ruling that they were relevant to the proper noncharacter purpose of showing MacDonald's contempt- and, thus, his
motive for harming-the baby R1167-68. The trial court also ruled that
evidence that MacDonald called G.B. a "whiner" and flipped him off was
offered for the proper noncharacter purpose of showing MacDonald's
"contempt" for the baby. R1166-69. But the court inexplicably ruled that
evidence of MacDonald's past yelling at the baby and his past abuse of the
baby were not offered for any proper noncharacter purpose. R1164-65.
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Evidence of MacDonald's yelling and past abuse was properly
offered for the same purposes as the evidence of MacDonald's racist
comments, name-calling, and obscene gestures.

Like that evidence, this

evidence also shows MacDonald's motive for harming this baby-namely,
his "contempt" for him. R1166-69. And, like that evidence, this evidence
rebuts MacDonald's current claim that this baby was injured accidentally.
The "trier-of-fact" is "entitled to know" all of this evidence precisely
because it "tend[s] to contradict" MacDonald's claim that G.B.'s "injuries
were the result of an accident," and also because it makes '"more plausible"'
the State's theory that MacDonald had a motive to intentionally hurt G.B.

Smith, 205 S.W.3d at 178; Bisner, 2001 UT 99, if 58.
In addition to proving motive and lack of accident, this evidence is
also admissible for the proper noncharacter purpose of showing context. A
prosecutor retains "the right to present evidence with broad narrative value
beyond the establishment of particular elements of a crime." State v. Verde,
2012 UT 60, if 28, 296 P.3d 673. This Court has also repeatedly recognized
that "other acts evidence may be admissible under rule 404(b) to show
context." State v. Labrum, 2014 UT App 5, i122, 318 P.3d 1151; see also State v.

Havatone, 2008 UT App 133, if 10, 183 P.3d 257; State v. Dominguez, 2003 UT
App 158, if 21, 72 P.3d 127.
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The supreme court's decision in State v. Tanner, 675 P.2d 539 (Utah
1983), illustrates this. There, the defendant was convicted of killing her
three-year-old daughter. Id. at 541. On appeal, the supreme court affirmed
the admission of evidence of past abuse, holding that it was admissible to
show, among other things, identity. Id. at 548. But the court also went on to
explain that "logic and the interests of justice demand as complete a story as
possible concerning the crime [of child abuse] and the surrounding
circumstances," which included the prior injuries. Id. This Court has thus
recognized that the State is entitled to "legitimate moral force of its
evidence." State v. Stapley, 2011 UT App 54, ,I13, 249 P.3d 572; see also State

v. Gulbransen, 2005 UT 7, if 37, 106 P.3d 734.
Here, the nature of MacDonald's relationship with G.B. is a critical
aspect of this case. MacDonald told detectives that he "loved" G.B. and
would not mistreat him. State's Exh. 4 at 31:00-32:12, 42:41; State's Exh. 5 at
33:45, 39:36, 41:44, 43:34, 49:18. The excluded evidence here shows
otherwise. For the jury to answer the central questions of how and why
MacDonald hurt G.B., it must know what their relationship was like.
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Excluding this evidence will prevent the jury from seeing the true picture of
that relationship. 5
C. The strong probative value of this evidence was not
substantially outweighed by any danger of unfair prejudice.

The excluded evidence was also admissible under rule 403. Under
that rule, relevant evidence '"may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."' Lucero, 2014 UT 15,
i(30 (quoting Utah R. Evid. 403). The rule is an "inclusionary rule," and
"presumes the admission of all relevant evidence except where the evidence
has an unusual propensity to unfairly prejudice, inflame, or 1nislead the
jury." State v. Otkovic, 2014 UT App 58, iJ15, 322 P.3d 746 (quotations and
citation omitted).

If the evidence "is prejudicial but is at least equally

5 As

noted, the trial court also concluded that evidence of
MacDonald's jealousy fell outside the 404(b) context. Instead, the court
concluded that this evidence was inadmissible under a direct relevancy
analysis. See R1164-69; see also Utah R. Evici. 401 & 402.
Evidence is relevant if it "has any tendency to make a fact more or
less probable than it would be without the evidence." Utah R. Evid. 401.
Here, the jealousy evidence is relevant for the same reasons described
above-namely, it helps establish MacDonald's contempt for G.B., thereby
(1) showing that he had a motive to hurt him, and (2) refuting MacDonald's
claim that the baby's injuries were accidentally inflicted.
Evidence showing that MacDonald was jealous of G.B. makes it more
probable that he hurt him intentionally, rather than accidentally. The trial
court thus also erred in concluding that it was irrelevant.
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probative," "it is properly admissible."

Id. (quotations and citation

omitted).
Here, the trial court concluded that evidence of MacDonald's racist
comments was admissible under this test. But the court then concluded that
evidence that MacDonald called G.B. a "whiner," flipped the baby off, and
abused him was inadmissible under rule 403 because, in the court's view, its
probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice. R1164-69.
But if evidence of MacDonald's racist comments toward G.B. is
admissible under rule 403, then evidence of MacDonald's name-calling,
obscene gestures, and prior mistreatment was admissible too.

Like the

racist comment evidence, the excluded evidence has strong probative value.
The infant victim in this case obviously cannot speak for himself. Thus,
MacDonald- if he chooses to testify-will be the only person who was in
the room that day who can testify about what happened.
MacDonald's police interviews provide some sense of what that
testimony will be. There, MacDonald claimed that he "loved" G.B., and he
repeatedly denied having any reason to hurt him. State's Exh. 4 at 31:0032:12, 42:41; State's Exh. 5 at 33:45, 39:36, 41:44, 43:34, 49:18. To prove its
case, the State must therefore give the jury a plausible reason why this adult
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man would violently assault a helpless baby that he now claims to love.
Like the racist comment evidence that the court deemed admissible, the
excluded evidence does precisely that by showing that MacDonald hated
G. B. and had previously acted on his feelings through verbal and physical
mistreatment.
That high probative value is not substantially outweighed by any
danger of unfair prejudice. Rule 404(b) does not speak of mere prejudice to
the defendant-it speaks of "unfair prejudice." Evidence is not unfairly
prejudicial merely "because it is detrimental to a party's case." McCullar,
2014 UT App 215, if48 (quotations and citation omitted).

"[U]nfair

prejudice" exists "only where the evidence has an undue tendency to
suggest decision upon an improper basis."

Lucero, 2014 UT 15, ,132

(quotations and citation omitted). "Only when evidence poses a danger of
rousing the jury to overmastering hostility does it reach the level of unfair
prejudice that rule 403 is designed to prevent." Killpack, 2008 UT 49, ,153.
Under rule 403's "more specialized meaning" of prejudice, exclusion
is not required merely because the evidence "possesses a tendency to
suggest a decision upon an improper basis." State v. Maurer, 770 P.2d 981,
984 (Utah 1989). Instead, the "critical question is whether certain testimony
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is so prejudicial that the jury will be unable to fairly weigh the evidence."

State v. Guzman, 2006 UT 12, ~27, 133 P.3d 363.
Here, MacDonald will suffer no unfair prejudice from admitting this
evidence. Like the racist comment evidence, which will be admitted, it
suggests that MacDonald disliked his girlfriend's baby. But nothing in that
suggests that MacDonald has a propensity to abuse children in general.
Rather, what it shows is that he had a reason to hurt this particular baby
and had acted on that reason in the past. Thus, any prejudice that he will
suffer from the evidence is fair, not unfair.
In addition, this evidence is "tame in comparison" to other evidence
that will be admitted at trial. Lucero, 2014 UT 15, ~35. First, the jury is
already going to hear about MacDonald's racist comments. The excluded
evidence only confirms his dislike for the baby. Second, this jury is going to
hear graphic evidence about G.B.'s injuries, including evidence of severe
retinal hemorrhages, subdural bleeding, and damage to the baby's internal
organs. It will also hear from doctors who will testify that such injuries do
not occur accidentally, that they are caused only by significant force. When
coupled with the undisputed testimony that MacDonald was the only adult
with the baby when he was injured, the implication will be that MacDonald
intentionally and violently hurt him.
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If the jury believes this medical evidence, it will necessarily believe
that MacDonald intentionally shook this baby hard enough to cause severe,
life-threatening injuries. But if it doesn't believe this medical evidence- if,
for example, it accepts anticipated testimony from MacDonald's experts
suggesting that these injuries are not consistent with shaken baby
syndrome- it will likely acquit.
Evidence of MacDonald's contempt and past mistreatment of G.B.
·helps explain MacDonald's motives. But it is not likely that a jury that does
not believe that the baby's injuries were caused by violent shaking would
convict MacDonald of second degree felony child abuse merely because it
learned that he disliked him. In sum, the evidence is admissible under a 403
analysis.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse the trial court's
rulings.
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Addenda

AddendumA .

Addendum A

Utah R. Evid. 404. Character Evidence Not Admissible to Prove Conduct; Exceptions; Other Crimes
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity
therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by
an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or if evidence of a trait of
character of the alleged victim of the crime is offered by the accused and admitted
under Rule 404(a)(2), evidence of the same trait of character of the accused offered
by the prosecution;
(2) Character of alleged victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the
alleged victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut
the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the alleged victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the alleged
victim was the first aggressor;
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in
Rules 607, 608, and 609.
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution
in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during
trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the nature of any
such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.
(c) Evidence of similar crimes in child molestation cases.
(1) In a criminal case in which the accused is charged with child molestation,
evidence of the commission of other acts of child molestation may be admissible
to prove a propensity to commit the crime charged provided that the prosecution
in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during
trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the nature of any
such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.
(2) For purposes of this rule "child molestation" means an act committed in
relation to a child under the age of 14 which would, if committed in this state, be a
sexual offense or an attempt to commit a sexual offense.
(3) Rule 404(c) does not limit the admissibility of evidence otherwise admissible under Rule 404(a), 404(b), or any other rule of evidence.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

Plaintiff,

FINDNG OF FACTS, CONCLUSION OF
LAW AND ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS
IN PART AND DENYING THE MOTION
IN PART

vs.

CASE NO. 131400351

STATE OF UTAH,

ROBBIE MACDONALD
JUDGE: Derek P. Pullan
Defendant,

Pursuant to Defendant's briefs, the State's verbal response, the evidentiary hearing and oral
arguments, the Court hereby makes the following finding of facts, conclusion of law and order:
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I.
FINDING OF FACTS
Defendant's Interview on January 18, 2013
I.

1. On January 18, 2013, in American Fork, Utah, a 911 call was made regarding G.B., a

I 0-month old, who was not breathing. At the time of the call, defendant was
watching G.B., his girlfriend's son.
2. After paramedics transported G.B. to the hospital, Detective Christensen interviewed
defendant at his home. After the initial interview at the scene, Detective Metcalf
transported defendant to the American Fork police station for further questioning.
3. Detective Metcalf interviewed defendant regarding the events that led up to the child
sustaining injuries.
4. The interview room door was closed but not locked.
5. Detective Metcalf was the only other person in the interview room, other than the
defendant.
6. The interview was audio and video recorded.
7. During the interview, defendant stated that G.B. had fal1en asleep on the living room
floor. He picked up G.B. and laid him down in his crib. When defendant later
checked on G.B., he found him unresponsive with vomit on his mouth and not
breathing. Defendant yelled for his roommate to help. The roommate called 911 and
began CPR. Paramedics and police arrived on scene and took over resuscitation
efforts. G.B. was transported to American Fork Hospital.
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8. After the interview, defendant was not arrested and a police officer transported him
back to his residence.
9. The Court finds that defendant was interrogated.
1O.The proximity of the interrogation is close in time to the child having suffered
serious physical injury.
11.The interview was accusatory in nature.
12.Detective MetcaJfs Jine of questioning implied that defendant did something wrong.
13 .Defendant was left alone in the interrogation room for approximately forty minutes
during the course of the interview.
14.The Court finds that defendant was not free to leave.
15.The Court finds that defendant was in custody for purposes of Miranda.
16.Although Detective Metcalf read defendant his Miranda rights, he failed to obtain an
express waiver of Miranda rights, since he never asks defendant if he waived his
rights.
17.Additionally, the Court finds that Detective Metcalf undermined the Miranda
warning when he stated he wasn't sure that defendant needed his rights to be read to
him.

18.The Court finds that defendant did not have a full awareness of the nature and
consequences of the rights being abandoned and that an implied waiver was not the
product of a free deliberate choice.
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LEGAL CONCLUSION:
Defendant's Interview on January 18, 2013

1. The Court concludes that defendant was subjected to a custodial interrogation and Detective

Metcalf was required to provide defendant with the Miranda warning.
2.

The Court concludes there was no express waiver of Miranda rights.

3. Expressions of police that undermine the importance of the constitutional rights described in

the Miranda warning significantly impacts the Court's determination of whether or not
waiver is voluntary, knowing and intelligent.
4. The Court concludes there was no implied waiver.
5. For these reasons, the Court grants the defendant's motion to suppress statements made by
defendant to Detective Metcalf on January 18, 2013.

II.
FINDING OF FACTS:
Defendant's Interview on January 23, 2013

1. Doctors from the Primary Children's Hospital diagnosed G.B. with Abusive Head Trauma.

Subsequently, defendant was requested by police to return to the police station for further
questioning.
2. Defendant's grandfather drove him to the American Fork police department on January;fh ..l
Vv.L
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3. Sergeant Ludlow interviewed defendant, while Lieutenant Liddiard was also present in the
room.
4. The interview room was closed but not locked.
5. The intervie,:v was audio and video recorded.
6. During this interview, defendant provided additional information. He stated that while he
carried a sleeping G.B. to his crib that he tripped on a rug, and that G.B. fell from his arms,
and that his head hit the cement flooring. He then comforted the child and laid him down in
his crib.
7. After the interview, defendant was permitted to leave the police station with his grandfather
and was not arrested at that time.
8. The Court finds that the interview was an interrogation. The intei·view took place at the
police station, defendant was the focus of the investigation and the questioning was
accusatory.
9. Sergeant Ludlow stated that everything was pointing at defendant and that there was more to
the defendant's version of events. The Sergeant stated that defendant was being "deceitful"
and continued to express his non-belief during the interrogation.
l O.The Court finds that defendant did not feel free to leave.
11.The Court finds that defendant was in custody for purposes of Miranda.
12.Prior to defendant's statements, Sergeant Ludlow asked defendant if he remembered when
,...
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Detective Metcalf '"brought you in [and] talked to you about your rights and all that stuff?
Do you remember all that stuff, right?" Defendant nods in the affirmative and Sergeant
Ludlow proceeded to question him.
13 .Sergeant Ludlow did not ask defendant if he was willing to speak to police, rather he
continued with the interrogation.
14.After defendant made statements to Sergeant Ludlow, he was then asked to provide a signed
written statement that included the Miranda warning.
15.The Court finds no express Miranda warning was given by Sergeant Ludlow.
16.The interrogation occurred five days after the first interrogation. This fact is important to the
Cow1, especially since defendant was not read his Miranda rights or asked if he \Vas willing
to waive his rights.
17.Sergeant Ludlow's reference to defendant's "rights and all that stuff," did not explain to
defendant the Miranda warning in a way that would explain how to exercise his rights.
18.The Court does not find facts that demonstrate an implied waiver.
19.The Court finds the police asked questions first and then provided Miranda later.

LEGAL CONCLUSION:
Defendant's Interview on January 23, 2013

1. The Court concludes that defendant was subjected to a custodial interrogation and Sergeant
Ludlow was required to provide defendant \:Vith the Miranda warning.
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1. That kind of reference to rights read five days earlier did not place defendant in a situation
where he could make a waiver with full awareness, both as to the nature and consequence of
the rights that he was abandoning.
2. The fact that defendant signs a written statement with a Miranda warning after making

statements during the course of the interrogation does not correct the previous mistake,
pursuant to the ruling in Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004).
3. The State failed to meet its burden to demonstrate that there was either an express or implied

waiver of Miranda rights.
4. Under the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that this interrogation resulted in an

unwarned statement and grants defendant's motion to suppress the statements made to
Sergeant Ludlow on January 23, 2013.

III.

FINDING OF FACTS:
Defendant's Interview on January 24, 2013

1. At the request of police, defendant returned to the American Fork police department for
additional questioning. Defendant's grandfather drove him to the police department on
January 24, 2013
2. Defendant was interviewed by Lieutenant Liddiard.
3. The interview door was closed but not locked.
4. The interview was audio and video recorded.

001146
February 05, 2015 04:38 PM

7 of 10

5. At the beginning to the interview, Lieutenant Liddiard informed defendant that his
grandfather had already gone home. Lieutenant Liddiard told the grandfather that he didn't
know how long the interview would be. Lieutenant Liddiard told the grandfather that he
would take defendant home. Defendant was then asked, "Is that okay if we just take you
home?" Defendant replied, "That's fine."
6. During the interview, defendant repeated the "tripping" and "dropping" statement.
7. After this interview, police took defendant back to the residence to videotape him conducting
a demonstration of the incident.
8. Prior to defendant's statements, Lieutenant Liddiard referenced the Miranda warning given

earlier by Detective Metcalf on January 18, 2013, and that Sergeant Ludlow had reminded
defendant of his Miranda rights again on January 23, 2013 with Sergeant Ludlow.
Lieutenant Liddiard then suggested to defendant that, "You 're still willing to talk to us
today," to which defendant affirms.
9. Then Lieutenant Liddiard gives a complete Miranda warning and asks defendant if he

understands the rights. Defendant says, "Yes." Liddiard asks, HAre you still willing to talk to
us?" Defendant affirms.
l 0.Lieutenant Liddiard expressed his non-belief in defendant's story and the questioning was
accusatory. Lieutenant Liddiard continued to tell defendant that his story was "impossible"
and states that he is hiding something because of his body language.
I I .Lieutenant Liddiard tells defendant that he is "killing his integrity."
12.Lieutenant Liddiard repeatedly referenced the "tripping" and ""dropping" statements he made
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on the previous day with Sergeant Ludlow.
13.The Court finds that Defendant's interview with Lieutenant Liddiard, at the police station,
was a custodial interrogation and that defendant did not feel free to leave.
14.However, the Court finds that there was an express waiver and that defendant vo]untarily
waived his Miranda rights.

LEGAL CONCLUSION:
Defendant's Interview on January 24, 2013

I. The Miranda warning ,vas required to be given by Lieutenant Liddiard
2. Based on the totality of the circumstances, the Court concludes that there was an express
waiver and that it was voluntary.

1.

The Court concludes that a one day separation, between the January 23 rd and 24 th
interviews, is a sufficient break between the unwarned statement and the subsequent warned
statement, pursuant to the ruling in Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004).

1. Therefore, the Court denies defendant's motion to suppress as to the third interrogation held
on January 24, 2014, with Lieutenant Liddiard, at the police station.
ORDER

For the reasons stated above, the Court grants the defendant's motion to suppress statements made
by defendant during his interviews on January 18, 2013 and on January 23, 2013. However, the
Court denies the defendant's motion to suppress statements made during the interview conducted on
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January 24, 2013.

Court seal and signature located at the top of page 1.
----------------------End of Order-----------------------

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on February 5, 2015, I caused to be delivered a copy of the foregoing Amended
Proposed Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law and Order Granting Defendant's Motion to
Suppress in Park and Denying the Motion in Part filed in the above-captioned matter to the
following parties via electronic mail:
Utah County Attorney's Office
I 00 East Center, Suite 2100
Provo, Utah 84606

Isl MICHAEL B. NELSON
MICHAEL B. NELSON
PARALEGAL
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AddendumC

AddendumC

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY,STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

v.

RULING AND ORDER
ON STATE'S SECOND MOTION
TO ADMIT RULE 404(b) EVIDENCE
Case No. 131400351

ROBBJE MACDONALD,
Judge Derek P. Pullan
Defendant.
Defendant Robbie MacDonald is charged with one count of Child Abuse, a second
degree felony. The State alleges that Defendant inflicted head trauma and brain damage upon his
girlfriend's IO-month old son ("Gabriel") on or about January 18, 2013.
The State moved to admit Rule 404(b) evidence including evidence that the Defendant
(I) yelled frequently at Gabriel; (2) called Gabriel a "whiner;" (3) called Gabriel a "spick;" (4)

"flipped off' Gabriel; and (5) was jealous of the attention Defendant's girlfriend (Addie
Loveridge) paid to Gabriel.
After hearing oral argument on the State's motion, the Court denied the State's motion to
admit evidence that the Defendant yelled at Gabriel and called him a whiner. The Court granted
the State's motion to admit evidence that the Defendant called Gabriel a uspick," "flipped oft''
Gabriel, and was jealous.

After further reflection, the Court vacated its ruling granting in part the State's motion.
The Court explained:
Use of the term "spick" and flipping someone off might not be words and actions
of sufficient contempt to motivate a person to violence. In analyzjng tlus issue
the timing and frequency with which these words and actions were used are
significant factors in determining whether they are being offered for an improper
character purpose in violation of the Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b). Furthermore,
the depth and frequency of expressions of jealousy, and whether or not those
sentiments changed over time are also important factors in determining whether
evidence that the Defendant was jealous of the alleged victim is being offered for
an improper character purpose..

(See, Order Vacating Prior Ruling, 11/26/14).
Because Rule 404(b) evidence must be scrupulously examined, the Court scheduled the
State's motion for an evidentiary hearing. At the hearing, the State called only one witnessAddie Loveridge (''Loveridge,,).

Having carefully considered the evidence presented, the Court now enters the following:

RULING
Findings of Fact

($.;;:

1. Loveridge met the Defendant in June or July 2012. She introduced Gabriel to Defendant
in July 2012. Transcript of 1/20/15 Evidentia1y Hearing "Transcript "at 6.
1

2

2. Loveridge brought Gabriel to Defendant's grandparent's home for "play dates" with the
Defendant's daughter (K.M.). These play dates occurred almost every other day for the

next 4-5 months. Tra_nscript, at 7.
3. During this period of time, Defendant commented five or six times that Gabriel "was
slow' to develop-that he should be c1awling and eating by now. Id. at 10.
1

4. Loveridge noticed that Defendant did not like to be touched by Gabriel and that he would
not stop K.M. from pushing or hitting Gabriel. Id. at 10· 12.
5. In late 2012, Loveridge and Defendant decided to move in together to "work on being a
better family." Id. at 58.
6. A mutual friend needed a roommate and so Loveridge and Defendant decided to move
1

into the basement of the friend s home. This occurred during the first week of December
2012, six weeks before Gabriel was injured. Id.
7. At the 1ime Loveridge and Defendant moved in together, she was working on Fridays,
Saturdays, and Sundays for approximately 20 hours per week. As Christmas
approached, Loveridge took advantage of overtime opportunities and worked 30 hours
per week. Defendant was not yet enrolled in school and was home 80% of the time.
Defendant enrolled in school the week that Gabriel was injured. Id. at 14-16.

3

8. Loveridge testified that she went to San Diego, California for Christmas. She spent seven
days there and returned before New Year's Day. Transcript, at 17. At the evidentiary
hearing, the San Diego trip became a reference point for when events happened.
9. From the date Loveridge and the Defendant moved in together until Loveridge left for
San Diego, Defendant was with Gabriel every day. During this period:
a. Defendant poked fun at Gabriel stating that "hjs eyes are crossed" and his "perns
is very small." Id. at 19.

b. Defendant would not stop K.M. from hitting Gabriel. Id. at 12.
c. The Defendant picked up Gabriel by the anns, carried him across the room, and
"plopped him down" on a bean bag chair. Loveridge stated that this was "too
rough for my liking" and that she knew it hurt Gabriel because he was crying.
Loveridge testified that this happened on several occasions, but two times before

she left for San Diego. Id. at 22.
d. Neither Gabriel nor K.M. was allowed in the bed that Loveridge and Defendant
shared. Loveridge was required to breastfeed Gabriel in the child's room. Id. at
27-28.

10. From the day that Loveridge returned from San Diego to January 18, 2013, Loveridge

witnessed the following:
4
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a. About one week before Gabriel was injured, he had a cold and runny nose.
Loveridge normally administered the medicine to Gabriel. However, one time
she asked the Defendant to do it. Thereafter, she observed bruises on both of

Gabriel's cheeks. When she asked about this, Defendant told her that Gabriel had
fallen on a toy. Transcript, at 35-36.
b. On January 13, 2013, the couple got into a heated dispute. Before or during the
argument, Defendant "flipped off' Gabriel with both hands. Loveridge witnessed
this through the reflection in a fish tank. This was a kind of "last straw" for
Loveridge. Defendant confessed to her that he was addicted to marijuana.
Loveridge took the marijuana away. After the fight, Defendant agreed to be a
better dad. Id. at 46-49.
11. In the six weeks that Loveridge and the Defendant lived together, Loveridge witnessed
the following:

a. Defendant called Gabriel a "spick" no more than four times. Id. at 40.
b. While looking for a new place to live, Loveridge and Defendant drove by a trailer
park. Defendant stated that "Gabriel would fit in there because [the trailer park]
is full of spicks, but the rest ofus wouldn't." This occurred after Christmas and

after the Defendant signed up for school. Id. at 43.
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c. Defendant said "Gabriel does not fit in our family because he is brov..n." This
occurred one time after Loveridge returned from San Diego. Id. at 44.

d. Defendant called Gabriel uthe Mexican." Loveridge testified that this occurred

''more than once for sure." Transcript, at 44-45.
12. Loveridge testified as to several examples of bad parenting, including:

a. Defendant had left both children unchanged resulting in them being covered in
feces. Id. at 64.
b. Defendant would not feed Gabriel when he was hungry, or at least would feed
K.M. first. Id. at 25.
c. Defendant would yell excessively. Id. at 53-54.
13. Loveridge testified that Defendant v..-as jealous of Gabriel because Defendant (1) did not
like Gabriel clinging to her; (2) encouraged her to leave the room and let Gabriel cry it

out; (3) would pull Gabriel away from her; (4) encouraged Loveridge to get Gabriel's
father to take him for parent time; and (5) wanted to have time with just her and K.M. Id.
at 51-52.

14. Finally, Loveridge testified that from the first week of December 2012 through January
18, 2013, Defendant yelled constantly and excessively. Id. at 54.

6

Conclusions of Law

Three-Part Test to Determine Admissibility of Rule 404(b) Evidence
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a

person in order to show action in confonnity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident. URE 404(b). The Utah Supreme Court developed a three part
analysis to determine whether evidence is admissible under rule 404(b). State v. Nelson-

Waggoner, 2000 UT 59, ~~J 17-20:
First, the court must determine if the bad acts evidence is being offered for a proper, noncharacter purpose, such as one of those specifically listed in rule 404(b). Second, the court must
detennine whether the bad acts evidence meets the requirements of rule 402, which permits
admission of only relevant evidence. Third, the court must determine whether the bad acts
evidence meets the requirements of rule 403, which excludes evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issue, or misleading
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.
In determining whether the bad acts evidence meets rule 403 requirements, Utah courts

may consider a number of factors, including those found in Shickles: (1) the strength of the
evidence of the other bad acts; (2) the similarities between the crimes; (3) the interval of time
7

that has elapsed between the crimes; (4) the need for the evidence; (5) the efficacy of alternative
proof; (6) the degree to which the evidence probably will rouse the jury to overmastering
hostility. Stare v. Shick/es, 760 P.2d 291, 295-96 (Utah 1988).
The difficulty in applying rule 404(b) rises from the fact that evidence of prior bad acts
often will yield dual inferences. State v. Verde, 2012 UT 60, ~ 16. Thus, when prior bad acts
evidence is presented under rule 404(b), the court should carefully consider whether it is
genuinely being offered for a proper, non-character purpose, or whether it might actually be
aimed at sustaining an improper inference of action in conformity with a person's bad character.

Id. at~ 18. If the evidence sustains both a proper and an improper inference under rule 404(b),
the courts should also balance the two inferences against each other under rule 403 to determine
which purpose dominates. The bad act evidence should be excluded if its tendency to sustain a
proper inference is outweighed by its propensity for an improper inference or for jury confusion

about its real purpose. Id.
Rule 403 aml the Sfliclcles Factors
While some of the factors laid out in Shick/es may be helpful in assessing probative value
of the evidence in one context, they may not be helpful in another. State v. Lucero, 2014 UT 15,
~

32. It is therefore unnecessary for courts to evaluate each and every factor and balance them

together in making their assessment. Id. This is because courts are bound by the test of Rule
403, and not limited to the factors laid out in Shick/es. Id.
8

In Lucero, the State offered evidence of the mother's past child abuse in order to prove

modus operandi and subsequently identity. The court used only a few of the Shick/es factors to
reach its determination. The similarity of the injuries increased their probative value. The baby
was injured in a similar way and by similar means on both occasions. Id. at~ 33. Moreover, the
short interval of time within which the injuries occurred also increased their probative value.
The court found that there was no risk of ovennastering hostility because the prior act was tame
in comparison to the fatal injury.
The court need not identify each of the Shick/es factors in its analysis as long as they
make a sufficient inquiry under Rule 403. State v. Thornton, 2014 UT App 265, ~ 39. The trial
court met the scrupulous examination requirement when it engaged in a three- or four-step
analysis, on the record, of the requirements for admission of prior bad acts evidence. Lucero,

~

36-37. Failure to analyze each category of bad acts separately does not comport with the court's
obligation to scrupulously examine 404(b) evidence. Thornton, at 142.
Moreover, and touching on the State's argument of context in the instant case, when the
charged crime and the prior acts are considered part of a single criminal episode, the evidence is
inextricably intertwined and 404(b) is not implicated. Id at~ 43. Prior acts that provide
necessary context to understand how the crimes occurred are not, however, "inextricably
intertwined" so as to put the evidence beyond the reach of 404(b). Id.

9

Finally, where the context of the evidence involves a doctrine of chances analysis, Verde
has displaced the Shick/es factors. State v. Labrum, 2014 UT App 5, ,I 28. When addressing the
probative value of other acts evidence in cases not governed by the doctrine of chances, Shick/es
factors remain relevant to the extent they are useful. Id.
Ultimately, the court is not required to apply the Shick/es factors rigidly, but rather must

carefully weigh the tendency of prior bad acts toward proper and improper inferences in the
context of the particular case and consider whntever factors are relevant to that analysis as it
scrupulously examines the evidence. Id.
Tlte Prior Bad Act Evidence At Issue
Yelling at the Cftildre11
Evidence that the Defendant yelled at Gabriel and K.M. excessively is not offered for a
proper non-character purpose. Rather, it is offered to show that the Defendant was an impatient
father and therefore more likely to have acted in accordance with that bad character trait on
January 18, 2013.
For this reason, the Court denies the State's motion in limine to admit this evidence.
Callilzg Gabriel a Whiner

Thls prior bad act is offered for the proper non-character purpose of showing that the

Defendant had contempt for Gabriel. The Defendant's ill-feelings towards Gabriel do make it
10

more likely that he assaulted him. However, calling someone a "whiner:' does not manifest the
kind of deep-seated contempt that would move a person to cause serious bodily injury. The
probative value of this statement is paper-thin and is substantially outweighed by the improper
character purpose-that the Defendant is an impatient or bad father.
For these reasons> the Court denies the State's motion in limine to admit this evidence.
Using Racial Slurs Toward Gabriel

Calling Gabriel a "spick," "the Mexican,,, and "brown" is offered for the proper noncharacter purpose of proving that the Defendant had contempt for Gabriel. This is especially true
in light of Defendant's statements that Gabriel "does not fit in our family because he is brown"

and that Gabriel would fit into a trailer park "full of spicks" while "the rest of us would not."
Transcript, at 43-45.

The feelings of the Defendant toward Gabriel in the weeks before January 18, 2013, the
day Gabriel was injured, are relevant to proving who injured Gabriel. Because the Defendant
viewed Gabriel as "the other.,-a stranger or in1erloper in the family Defendant wanted to have
with Loveridge-Defendant was less likely to exercise restraint in caring for Gabriel.

Finally, the probative value of these statements is high. As explained, the statements
demonstrate a deep-seated view that Gabriel did not belong in the family. Defendant made the

statements in Loveridge's presence and she therefore has personal knowledge of them. The
statements are made in the weeks immediately preceding the day Gabriel was injured. The
11

State's need for the evidence is great. Gabriel was injured at a time when he was in the sole care
of Defendant. Alternative proof of Defendant's state of mind in regard to Gabriel is limited. It is

unlikely that these statements will rouse the jury to ovennastering hostility, because, like Lucero,
they are tame in comparison to the alleged abuse. The statements are not offered to prove that
Defendant is a racist-that he hates all Hispanics-but rather to demonstrate that Gabriel was the
person upon whom Defendant's contempt rested. A limiting instruction, ifrequested by the
defense, would be effective in mitigating any improper use of the evidence.
For these reasons, the Court grants the State's motion to admit this evidence.
Flipping Off Gabriel
Five days before Gabriel was injured, the Defendant-in the course of a heated argument

with Loveridge-angrily "flipped off' Gabriel with both hands.
This prior bad act is offered for a proper non-character purpose-to show that the
Defendant had contempt for Gabriel. The Defendant's state of mind in relation to Gabriel is
relevant. However the probative value of this evidence is thin. Flipping someone off-while an
aggressive gesture-does not manifest an intent to kill or to do serious bodily injury. Moreover,
this appears to have been a one-time event, and the strength of the evidence is lacking.
Loveridge testified that she saw Defendant do this through a reflection in a fish tank. Other

evidence will effectively demonstrate how Defendant perceived Gabriel. The risk of unfair

12

prejudice is high. The improper character purpose-to show that Defendant is an impatient
father or crude person-predominates.
For these reasons, the Court denies the State's motion in limine to admit this evidence.

Jealousy of Gabriel
Initially, the Court ruled that Defendant's "feeling of jealousy" is not a prior bad act
subject to Rule 404(b). While this is true, the conclusion that Defendant was jealous of Gabriel
constitutes the lay opinion of Loveridge. 1 Lay opinion must be "rationally based on the
witness's perception" and "helpful ... to detennining a fact in issue." URE 701(a)(b).
Here, Loveridge testified that Defendant was jealous of Gabriel because Defendant (1)
did not like Gabriel clinging to her; (2) encouraged her to leave the room and let Gabriel cry it
out; (3) would pull Gabriel away from her; (4) encouraged Loveridge to get GabriePs father to
take him for parent time; and (5) wanted to have time with just her and K.M. Transcript, at 5152.

· 1 Defendant's

own statement, if any, that he was jealous of Gabriel is not subject to Ruic '10 I. Defendant has
personal knowledge of his own state of mind. A feeling of jealousy is not a prior bad act. The Defendant's own
description of his slate of mind toward Gabriel in the weeks preceding January 18, 2013 is relevant. The probative
value of Defendant's jealousy is limited by the degree to which Defendant experienced this feeling'. The content of
Defendant's •~ealousy statement" and the comex1 in which the statement was made will clearly affect the probative
value oflhe statement. The Court lacks sufficient information to detcnninc whether the probative value of this
evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
13

While Loveridge's opinion is rationally based on the facts she observed, her opinion is
not helpful to detennining a fact in issue. The jealousy she describes is not manifest in ways that
would suggest a deep-seated envy that would motivate Defendant to commit a violent act against
Gabriel. Therefore, Loveridge's opinion would not be helpful to the trier of fact.
For this reason, the Court denies the Defendant's motion in limine to admit Loveridge's
lay opinion that Defendant was jealous of Gabriel.
Pltvsical Treatment of Gabriel

There is now evidence in the record that Defendant (1) may have bruised Gabriel's
cheeks when attempting to administer medicine to him; and (2) several times picked Gabriel up
by the anns in a rough manner, carried him across the room, and dropped him on a bean bag
chair. Transcript, at 35-36, 22.
These acts are not being offered for a proper non-character purpose. At first glance, the
evidence appears to fit into the "absence of mistake or accident" box-a proper non•character
purpose under Rule 404(b). After all> Defendant has asserted that he accidently dropped Gabriel
on the early afternoon of January 18, 2013.

14

However, a more careful analysis demonstrates the fallacy of this conclusion. The State
does not contend that Gabriel was injured when Defendant intentionally dropped him. 2 Indeed, it
is the State's position that a fall from the height described by Defendant could not produce the
injuries Gabriel sustained. Thus, evidence that Defendant intentionally dropped Gabriel on prior
occasions is not relevant and therefore inadmissible.
There is evidence in the record on which a reasonable jury could find that Defendant
bruised Gabriel's cheeks while administering medicine to him. URE l 04(b), However, there
does not appear to be a proper non-character purpose for this evidence. Even if there was, the
probative value of this evidence is substantially ourweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
The evidence that Defendant caused the bruising is circumstantial. There is little similarity
between the mechanism of injury to Gabriel's cheeks and the mechanism of injury that caused
Gabriel's brain damage, Finally, there is a high risk that the jury would conclude that because
Defendant injured Gabriel on one occasion, he is more likely to have injured him on January 18.

This is the very purpose forbidden under Rule 404(a) and it clearly predominates.
For these reasons, the Court denies the state's motion in limine to admit evidence that
Defendant intentionally dropped Gabriel on prior occasions and injured Gabriel while
administering medicine.

If this were the State's theory, the State might rebut Defendant's claim of mistake or accident
by introducing other instances in which Defendant intentionally dropped Gabriel.
l
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ORDER
For these reasons, the Court GRANTS the State's Second Motion to Admit 404(b)

evidence in part, and DENIES it in part.
This is the final order of the Court on this issue. No further action is necessary.
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